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This paper considers the social costs implied by ineﬃcient allocation of
contracts in a ﬁrst price, sealed bid procurement auction with asymmetric
bidders. We adopt a constrained (piecewise linear) strategy equilibrium
concept and estimate the structural parameters of the bidders’ distribu-
tion of costs. We estimate social costs deﬁned as the predicted cost dif-
ference between the winning ﬁrm and the most eﬃcient bidding ﬁrm. We
also compare the expected procurement costs under two diﬀerent auction
formats. The data is collected from procurement auctions of road painting
in Sweden during 1993-99. The results indicate that the social costs of
ineﬃcient contract allocation is about 1.7 per cent of total potential social
cost and that an eﬃcient second price auction would lower the expected
procurement cost by 2.8 per cent.
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equilibrium, simulation.
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Each year the Swedish Road Adminstration (SRA) procures goods and services
to maintain large parts the public road net. The procurements are decentralized
to seven autonomous regions and organized as ﬁrst price, sealed bid auctions
with a relatively moderate number of potential contractors. At each separate
procurement, the bidding contractors diﬀer in size, location, and workload, and
they consequently face diﬀerent costs to complete the contract put out for ten-
der. These diﬀerences are observable for all participants in the market.
Commonly known asymmetries across bidders implies that the ﬁrst price
auction procedure may fail to allocate the contract to the most eﬃcient (low
cost) ﬁrm. That is, the ﬁrst price auction is not eﬃcient if the bidders draw
their values (costs) from asymmetric distributions (Hansen 1984, Milgrom &
Weber 1982).An intuitive deﬁnition of the social costs associated with ineﬃ-
cient allocation is thus the cost diﬀerence between the contracted and the most
eﬃcient bidding ﬁrm. However, changing the identity of the contracted ﬁrm
in one auction may alter the identities of winning ﬁrms in proceeding auctions
due to dynamic eﬀects caused by capacity constraints. In a complete analysis
such eﬀects should be accounted for. In this paper, we only consider the ﬁrst
order, static eﬀects of ineﬃcient contract allocation. Further, if participation is
endogenous, changing the auction design may also change the decision to par-
ticipate. We believe that this is of less importance in this case since the ﬁrms
with relatively low cost draws are likely to participate irrespective of the auction
format. The endogenous participation decision is probably more important in
the right tail of the cost distribution. Hence, we abstract from this feature.
There is also an issue about expected procurement cost, i.e., the cost ﬁnanced
by taxation in the case of public procurements. Assuming private values, and
risk neutral, ex ante symmetric bidders, the standard auctions are all revenue
equivalent and eﬃcient (Vickrey 1961). In the asymmetric case, the revenue
equivalence breaks down and the revenue ranking becomes ambiguous (Maskin
1& Riley 2000a). Hence, it is an empirical question of which auction format
minimizes the procurement costs. Therefore we also perform a Monte Carlo
analysis that simulates the procurement costs under diﬀerent auction formats.
One should also note that we are only concerned about ﬁrst order social costs.
There is of course a second order eﬀect stemming from the cost of ﬁnancing the
public contract. Changing the auction mechanism may also change the expected
procurement costs, and thereby the cost of funding.
In recent research, the assumption on symmetric bidders in ﬁrst price auc-
tions has been relaxed by several authors (Pesendorfer 2000, Maskin & Riley
2000a, Lebrun 1999). In the independent private value model with continuous
types, the results illustrate that the Nash equilibrium can be stated as a solution
to a system of ﬁrst order ordinary diﬀerential equations. However, the empiri-
cal work on structural estimation with asymmetric bidders has been obstructed
by the computational diﬃculties associated with the solution of the Nash equi-
librium with asymmetric bidders (Bajari 2000, Bajari & Ye 2000, Marshall,
Meurer, Richard & Stromquist 1994) Also, the Nash equilibrium itself has been
the subject of some criticism due to the high degree of rationality that is imposed
on the players and their mathematical capabilities. This criticism has motivated
the development of an alternative solution concept where the players strategies
are constrained to some predeﬁned set of feasible strategies (Armantier, Florens
& Richard 2000). These feasible strategies could be interpreted either as Nash
equilibrium approximations or as rules-of-thumb.
This paper evaluates the social costs induced by the ineﬃcient allocation
procedure the ﬁrst price, sealed bid auction constitutes if the bidders are ex
ante asymmetric. We adopt a constrained strategy equilibrium approach in
which the players are constrained to simpliﬁed, piecewise linear strategies. This
allows us to estimate the structural elements of the bidders’ private values,
i.e., the parameterized distribution of the bidders’ costs. Conditionally on these
distributions, we evaluate the social costs of ineﬃcient contract allocation in the
sample. We ﬁnally perform some simulations to assess the expected procurement
2costs for a second price procurement design that is eﬃcient in the presence of
asymmetries.
Our preliminary ﬁndings are that about 17 per cent of the contracts are
ineﬃciently allocated and that the implied social costs is about 1.7 per cent of
potential costs. Switching to an eﬃcient second price auction would in addition
yield a 2.6 per cent decrease in procurement costs.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we brieﬂy discuss concept of
constrained strategy equilibrium in the asymmetric ﬁrst price, sealed bid auc-
tion with independent private values. The appendix gives the corresponding
discussion on the Nash equilibrium. Section 3 gives a description of the pro-
curement market and the available data. The econometric model is presented
in section 4, and the results are presented in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Constrained strategy equilibrium
This section presents the Constrained Strategy Equilibrium (CSE) in a ﬁrst
price auction with independent private values and ex ante asymmetric bidders.
This brief presentation draws heavily from the original work by Armantier et al.
(2000). A discussion on the corresponding Nash equilibrium is relegated to
appendix.
The auction format considered here is a standard ﬁrst price, sealed bid pro-
curement auction. The format implies that the bidders simultaneously submit
sealed bids and the low bidder wins the contract and is compensated by her
bid. At a single game (auction), the set of players are denoted by N, and the
players are indexed by i = 1;:::;n. The continuous set of the players’ types
are denoted by T 2 Rn with elements t = (t1;:::;tn). The players’ types are
drawn from T =
Qn
i=1 Ti, using a joint distribution F(t) with support on [t;t].
The set of unconstrained feasible strategies is denoted by S =
Q
i2N Si with el-
ements s = (s1;:::;sn), (an unconstrained strategy proﬁle), which map types
into the set of feasible actions X =
Qn
i=1 Xi with elements x = (x1;:::;xn).
3The vector of individual von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions is denoted
by ˆ U(s;t) = (ˆ U1(s;t);:::; ˆ Un(s;t)), such that
ˆ Ui(s;t) = (si(ti) ¡ ti)1(si(ti) < sj(tj);8j 6= i) (1)
The structure of the game is thus deﬁned by Γ = (N;T;F;S; ˆ U), which is as-
sumed common knowledge.
Player i’s type, ti, is interpreted as the player’s cost to complete the contract,
which is drawn independently from a marginal distribution Fi(ti). Hence, the





A strategy si is interpreted as a bid function that transforms cost ti into bid
xi. Given the distribution of types F and a strategy proﬁle s, the induced
joint distribution of bids is denoted by G(x;s;F) with marginal distributions
Gi(xi;s;F).
An individual’s type ti is assumed private information. Hence, letting the
distribution of yi = minj6=ifsj(tj)g, i.e., the lowest of the rivals’ bids, be denoted
by G¤
¡i(yi;s¡i;F), where s¡i = (s1;:::;si¡1;si+1;:::;sn), a bidder’s expected




(si(ti) ¡ ti)(1 ¡ G¤
¡i(si(ti);s¡i;F))dFi(ti) (3)
As discussed in the appendix, the Nash equilibrium is deﬁned as the solu-
tion to a system of ordinary diﬀerential equations. The solutions can not be
expressed in closed form unless we impose severe restrictions on the distribution
of types. Hence, solving the unconstrained Nash equilibrium may be considered
a rather complicated procedure in the eyes of the bidders. Not only do the
bidders need to know the cost parameters of the competitors, they would also
need to solve a system of ordinary diﬀerential equations. As an alternative
4solution concept, Armantier et al. (2000) propose a Constrained Strategy Equi-
librium (CSE) concept. This concept only considers a constrained set of feasible
strategies, e.g. polynomials of low order or piece-wise linear splines, and lets
the bidders maximize their expected utilities over a few parameters that deﬁne
the strategies. (For a discussion of “Rules of Thumb” and NE approximation,
see Armantier, Florens & Richard (1999)).
Consider a compact set of constrained feasible strategies S
(P)
i ½ Si, where Si
is the unconstrained set of feasible strategies and (P) reﬂects the “dimension-











i ’s satisfy the “mutually best response” condition in the












i 2 S(P);8i 2 N




i (ti;F) = s(P)(ti;di;d¡i;F) (6)
where d = fdigi2N 2 Rmn denotes the collection of the parameters. The optimal
constrained strategy for ﬁrm i, conditional on the strategies of the other ﬁrms










5The CSE proﬁle is then deﬁned by the solution to the ﬁxed point problem
dCSE
i (F) = d¤
i(dCSE
¡i (F);F) (8)
and s(P);CSE(ti;di;d¡i;F) = s(P)(ti;dCSE
i ;dCSE
¡i ;F).
The calculation of the CSE involves a number of numerical issues. Dropping














The ﬁrst numerical problem stems from the fact that the distribution of the
rivals low bid G¤
¡i is a non-trivial transformation of the rivals’ type distributions.
It is, however, straightforward to make random draws from that distribution,
given the vector of CSE parameters d¡i.
Let yi = minj6=ifs(P)(tj;dj;F)g, then we can make a random draw (˜ ti; ˜ yi)
from the joint distribution (ti;yi) by simply making a random draw t = (ti;t¡i)
from the joint distribution F, transform the t¡i using the deﬁned strategy
s
(P)
¡i (t¡i;d¡i;F), and setting ˜ yi = minj6=ifs(P)(˜ tj;dj;µ)g. 1 Using R such ran-


















i) < ˜ yr) (10)
This approximation is not smooth in di since the indicator function equals
either 0 or 1 depending on its argument. In order to use standard numerical
methods to solve the maximization problem, we substitute the indicator function
for a smooth c.d.f. kernel estimator Kh(x) where h denotes the bandwidth that
determines the “smoothness” of the kernel.2 Hence, the approximative expected
1In the empirical analysis we use Halton draws instead of standard random number gen-
erators. This should reduce the variance of the integral estimator.
2As h ! 0, Kh() ! 1()



















Taking the ﬁrst derivatives w.r.t. di yields the ﬁrst order conditions, a
system of mn non-linear equations (m is the number of parameters in the con-


































@di is a simple function of ˜ tr
i and di. Choosing a kernel
K such that the derivative K0 can be expressed in closed form, further decreases
the computational burden.
In Figures 1 and 2, we illustrate the constrained strategy equilibriums for
a set of asymmetric ﬁrms and their relation to the Nash equilibrium. We use
a set of three asymmetric bidders, where the distribution of types is assumed
truncated normal N(¹i;3) where ¹ = (14;14:5;15) and 5 · t · 25. The Nash
equilibrium is numerically calculated using a Runge-Kutta algorithm combined
with the search algorithm discussed in appendix with " = 1e ¡ 10. Due to
numerical issues, the solutions presented in the ﬁgure are poor in the right tail
hand of the cost distributions. The horizontal axis shows the costs and the
vertical axis shows the optimal bid.
The constrained strategy set here consists of 3-piecewise linear splines with
ﬁxed nodes.3 The CSE could be interpreted as an approximative solution to
the NE equilibrium, which is highlighted in ﬁgure 2. Including more splines
would decrease the “distance” between the NE and the CSE. However, at this
stage, we will adopt a 3-piece spline.
3We discuss the construction of the splines in the empirical section.
























Figure 1: Constrained strategy equilibrium with three asymmetric bidders and
3-piecewise linear splines.














CSE:t~N(14,3)  NE:t~N(14,3) 






CSE:t~N(14.5,3)  NE:t~N(14.5,3) 






CSE:t~N(15,3)  NE:t~N(15,3) 
Figure 2: CSE and NE with three asymmetric bidders.
83 Market characteristics and Data
Every year, normally in spring, the Swedish Road Administration (SRA hence-
forth) contracts ﬁrms for maintenance of road markings in Sweden.4 The ﬁrms
are contracted through a ﬁrst-price sealed-bid auction. The SRA’s seven re-
gional oﬃces, where a regional oﬃce is responsible for the procurement in its re-
gion, conduct the auctions. A region consists of three or four provinces. In each
province, there are normally three types of road marking contracts subjected to
procurement bidding: thermoplastic, spray-plastic, and hand-applicated road
markings. Each contract is sold in a separate auction. The local oﬃce requires
in general that a bidding ﬁrm submit its sealed bids for the desired contracts si-
multaneously for all the provinces in their region. Also, each local oﬃce decides
on its own when to announce the contracts for the procurement of road mark-
ings in its region, when the sealed bids must at the latest be tendered, and when
to announce the results. Therefore, the outcome of the auctions in one speciﬁc
region may or may not be common knowledge before the ﬁrms must submit
their bids in another region. During the studied period 1993-1999, twelve ﬁrms
have been active in bidding. Some of them are nationwide, meaning that they
can operate in every province in Sweden, whereas other ﬁrms operate in just a
few provinces. The contracted ﬁrms normally fulﬁll their undertaking during
the summer (May-September).
The local oﬃce invites ﬁrms to tender bids for contract of road markings by
advertising the project and, on request, by sending out an inquiry document
to potential bidding ﬁrms. Among other things, this document contains infor-
mation about the demanded quantity of marking color, technical requirements
of the road marking material, required thickness and width of road markings,
instructions how the bids are to be evaluated, and the latest day to tender bids.
The tendered bids are denoted in price per kilo or price per meter. A bidding
ﬁrm is also usually required to enclose a description of its organization, the type
4On average the Swedish Road Administration yearly 1993-1999 spent about 100 Million
SEK on the procurement of diﬀerent types of road markings.
9of material, and the road marking equipment it intends to use.
To collect the data we went to the SRA’s local oﬃces and got extracts from
minutes of the results from the auctions. We have focused upon the procurement
of thermoplastic road markings, which represents about 50 % of the SRA’s total
cost for procurement of road markings. The data set covers all procurement
auctions of thermoplastic road markings in every province for the period 1993-
1999. The data set consists of 138 auctions with a total number of 621 bids.5
All bids are tendered in terms of price per unit (kilo or meter).6 Further, the
data set contains information about the date and province of each auction, the
quantity of tons of road marking material demanded, the number of ﬁrms that
has received the inquiry document and the identity of all bidders. We have
converted all bid data into real terms (1999 price level), using a branch price
index.7
The data that we have collected refers solely to contract characteristics,
such as size, location, etc. However, in the analysis, it is important to capture
any diﬀerence across the ﬁrms that may explain the variation in bids. At this
stage we focus on two diﬀerent dimensions. Since road markings require heavy
equipment (trucks, boilers, etc.), a ﬁrm’s distance to the contract site may
inﬂuence its costs. Further, the production also requires some special skills of
the work force. Hence, given that a ﬁrm has limited access to these specialists,
a ﬁrm’s costs may be characterized by increasing marginal costs. We construct
5In a couple of auctions we lack some of the rejected bids.
6A contract for thermoplastic road marking implies painting both thick and thin lines. For a
given quantity of road marking material, the thicker the line, or the broader the line, the lower
the contractor’s cost per kilo. In the inquiry document the local oﬃce very roughly speciﬁes
on what types of road marking lines the demanded quantity material is to be distributed. As
a general rule, the bidding ﬁrms do not submit their bids in terms of a total sum for carrying
out the contract, but in terms of price per kilo or price per meter for each type of road marking
line. Once all the bids are submitted, the SRA computes each ﬁrm’s competitive bid as a
weighted average of its prices for the various types of lines. The weight put on each price
is given in the inquiry document, i.e. it is common knowledge prior to the deadline. The
ﬁrm that submits the lowest weighted average bid, gets the contract. For the years 1993-
1995, the tendered bid has been a weighted average price per kilo, and since 1996 a ﬁrm’s
bid is expressed as a weighted average price per meter. Having knowledge of the relationship
between price per meter and the quantity road marking material that is needed to produce
one meter road marking of a given type of line, we have converted all bids into price per kilo.
7The branch index is “Entreprenadindex E84 2162 V¨ agmarkeringar” which includes wage
rates, material costs, etc.
10two variables that measures these dimensions.
From the minutes, we observe the bidding ﬁrms’ headquarter locations (and
production plants in the relevant cases). We assume that a ﬁrm must transport
its equipment from this location to the contract site. We do not have access to
the true distance. Therefore we construct a pseudo distance deﬁned as follows.
First, we create a proportional map of Sweden in the xy -plane. Next, we
calculate the coordinates of each province’s centra and denote these (xs
t;ys
t). For





i ). The distance, DISTit; between the ﬁrm i and the contract t site





i )2 + (ys
t ¡ y
f
i )2 ¤ scale, where scale is a scaling
factor to convert the pseudo distance into (approximative) kilometers. If a ﬁrm
has more than one production plant, we automatically deﬁne the distance as
the distance between the closest plant and the contract province.
The second variable measures a ﬁrm’s utilization rate at any given point in
time. This variable is constructed in two steps. First, we calculate the total
contract size (measured as tons) each ﬁrm has won in any single year. Firm
i’s capacity, CAPi, is then deﬁned as the maximum total contract size ﬁrm i
has won in any year. Next, a ﬁrm’s utilization rate at the letting of contract
t, UTILit; is deﬁned as the ratio between the sum of previously won contracts
(in tons) in auctions within the same year but prior to the letting of auction t
and the ﬁrm’s capacity. We measure the potential maximum utilization rate,
PUTILit, as the ratio between the sum of won and unannounced contracts (in
tons) at the letting date of contract t and the ﬁrm’s capacity.8 One should
note that the SRA is not the single buyer of these services. Also municipalities
procure road markings. Therefore, a ﬁrms utilization rate may be hidden since
we only observe a part of the market for any ﬁrm. It is also the case that some
of the ﬁrms are involved in other types of construction projects which may
8A ﬁrm has “won a contract at time t” if the winner (the ﬁrm) of the contract has been
publicly announced. A ﬁrm’s “open contracts” are those on which the ﬁrm has submitted
bids, but no winner has been announced. In many cases, several contracts has the same letting
date. In those cases, we have included the bids submitted to the other contracts in the open
contracts.
11Table 1: Descriptive statistics on contracts and winning bids
Mean Std Min Max Valid
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
TON 160:29 115:34 10:00 600:00 133:00
NYLAGG 80:85 93:81 1:00 500:00 74:00
NBIDS 4:64 1:22 1:00 7:00 138:00
BID 14:76 0:98 11:85 17:53 133:00
DIST 110:23 104:93 5:43 652:68 138:00
UTILR 0:07 0:14 0:00 0:65 138:00
PUTILR 1:81 4:59 0:00 39:80 138:00
Table 2: Descriptive statistics on bidders
Mean Std Min Max Valid
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
BID 15:57 1:29 11:85 21:23 597:00
DIST 166:46 141:30 5:43 806:50 621:00
UTILR 0:13 0:22 0:00 1:00 615:00
PUTILR 1:41 2:49 0:00 39:80 615:00
aﬀect the ﬁrm’s utilization rate. However, at this stage we abstract from these
features. We also construct an indicator variable INCUMit that equals 1 if ﬁrm
i was the incumbent bidder on contract t. Furthermore, we construct variables
that control for some of the competitors costs. For each ﬁrm we construct the
variables CMIND and CMINU that are deﬁned as the minimum distance and
utilization rate of the bidding competitors.9
Below we give some descriptive statistics of the sample. There are 138
observed auctions in the sample. Table 1 presents some statistics on these
contracts. The ﬁrm speciﬁc variables, fBID, DIST, UTILR, PUTILRg, refer
to the contracted ﬁrm. Table 2 presents some descriptive statistic on the bidding
ﬁrms, i.e., the statistics are based on the sample including all 621 bidding ﬁrms.
The sample statistics indicates that the winning ﬁrm is closer and has a
lower utilization rate than a bidding ﬁrm on average. We also look at the
ﬁrms’ bidding patterns. In Table 3, we present the activity of each ﬁrm in
each region, measured as the fraction of the total number of contracts in that
9Note that we use the bidding, not the potential, competitors’ observable costs.
12Table 3: Firm activity rate across regions
CLE EAB EKC FOG JOC NCC NOR PRO SAN SVA TIE Total
NORR 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.82 0.64 0.91 0.00 0.82 0.00 0.00 0.45 11.00
MITT 1.00 0.79 0.13 0.50 0.63 0.75 0.00 0.88 0.00 0.04 0.00 24.00
STOC 1.00 0.43 0.00 0.50 0.79 0.36 0.00 0.86 0.07 0.50 0.00 14.00
MALA 1.00 1.00 0.15 0.59 0.85 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 27.00
VAST 0.88 0.32 0.03 0.00 0.56 0.88 0.03 0.91 0.00 0.00 0.00 34.00
SYDO 0.95 0.57 0.00 0.00 0.76 0.76 0.00 0.81 0.05 0.05 0.00 21.00
SKAN 1.00 0.14 0.00 0.14 0.57 0.86 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 7.00
Table 4: Market shares across years
CLE EAB EKC FOG JOC NCC PRO SAN SVA
93 0.59 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.10 0.06 0.00 0.00
94 0.35 0.12 0.00 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.33 0.00 0.00
95 0.17 0.21 0.00 0.06 0.15 0.10 0.24 0.07 0.00
96 0.25 0.09 0.00 0.17 0.22 0.08 0.18 0.00 0.01
97 0.22 0.16 0.00 0.37 0.00 0.03 0.21 0.00 0.00
98 0.10 0.19 0.00 0.07 0.27 0.13 0.23 0.00 0.00
99 0.11 0.37 0.26 0.08 0.00 0.14 0.02 0.00 0.02
Average 0.27 0.18 0.03 0.10 0.12 0.09 0.19 0.01 0.01
region during the sample period a ﬁrm has submitted bid on. The order of
the rows corresponds roughly to the geographic location from north to south
of the regions. Column Total reports the total number of contracts procured
during the sample period 1993-1999. The results in Table 3 indicate that some
ﬁrms are active over the whole country, whereas other ﬁrms are concentrated
to speciﬁc regions.10
The market shares in terms of won contracts (in tons) in our sample is
presented in Table 4.11 Only ﬁrms that has a non-zero market share in any year
are included in the table. The bottom line (Total) reports the average market
share during the sample period. The results from Table 4 show that the market
shares vary substantially across years and ﬁrms. The largest ﬁrm, CLE, has an
average market share of 27 per cent, followed by PRO, and EAB.
10Firm EKC entered the market in 1999.
11A few contracts where the ton variable is missing are deleted from the sample.
134 Econometric speciﬁcations
This section presents the econometric speciﬁcations of a reduced form analysis
and the structural form analysis based on CSE. The reduced form analysis is
mainly done to reveal the “amount of asymmetry” across ﬁrms and the relevant
explanatory variables to these asymmetries.
4.1 Reduced form analysis
In order to assess the level of asymmetry across bidders and decide upon the
relevant set of explanatory variables, we estimate a reduced form model of the
level of bids. We account for potential selection bias via a selection model
procedure (Heckit). We have seen in the solution of the NE that a ﬁrm’s bid
is a function of all observable characteristics of the rival ﬁrms. However, in
order to reduce the number of explanatory variables we will only consider the
bidding ﬁrm’s observable characteristics and some observable characteristics
that summarize the bidding rivals’ characteristics.
Speciﬁcally, we assume that the decision of submitting a bid is governed by







where zit is a vector of ﬁrm and contract speciﬁc variables, ds
it is a set of
ﬁrm and region dummies and "s
it » N(0;1). Hence, ﬁrm i submits a bid on
contract t iﬀ SUBM¤
it > 0 and this event is indicated by the observable variable
SUBMit = 1. The parameters of equation (13) are estimated using maximum
likelihood (i.e., a standard Probit model).







where xit is a vector of ﬁrm and contract speciﬁc variables, and "b
it s N(0;¾2
b).
14A set of dummy variables is collected in db
it,which includes ﬁrm, region, and
time dummies. If the error terms in these equations are correlated, then the pa-
rameters of the bid level equation are biased. This correlation can be accounted












0ˆ ±s) to the bid level model. Hence,





±s + ¯¸ˆ ¸it + eit (15)
where eit » N(0;¾2
t). The coeﬃcient, ¯¸ = ¾b½, where ½ is the correlation
coeﬃcient of ("s;"b). The parameters are initially estimated using OLS on
diﬀerent sub-samples of active ﬁrms with White’s heteroscedasticity consistent
standard errors.
4.2 Structural form analysis
In the structural form analysis, we assume that the costs per kilo are normal
distributed where the mean is a linear function of a set of observable ﬁrm and
contract speciﬁc variables and a set of region and ﬁrm dummies. The vector
of observables includes the (log) size of contract measured in tons, the (log)
distance between the ﬁrm’s headquarter and the contract province (LNDIST),
the ﬁrm’s utilization rate at the time of the contract letting (UTILR), the
potential utilization rate (PUTIL), and a dummy for incumbent bidding ﬁrm
(INCUM). The variance of the stochastic term is assumed constant across
ﬁrms and contracts. Thus, the cost of ﬁrm i for contract t is
tit = z0
it° + »it (16)
» » N(0;¾2)
If the cost draws tti were observable the estimation would be completely
standard. For example, we could use a OLS estimator to estimate the vector
15of model parameters Ω = (°;¾).12 However, the costs are unobserved so this
simple estimator is not feasible. Therefore, a feasible estimator of the model
with unobserved costs is then deﬁned as the solution to the ﬁxed point problem



















(ˆ tit ¡ z0
itˆ °)2 (18)
where ˆ tit = s¡1(xit;d(z¢¢¢; ˆ °; ˆ ¾)) is the estimated types conditional on the CSE
equilibrium based on the distribution of types given by ˆ °, ˆ ¾, and zit.




ti (t;dti) = ¯ t +
2 X
p=0
dtip1(t < ¿p)(t ¡ ¿p) (19)
where ¿p denotes the high endpoint of the pth segment, i.e., the nodes.13 The
nodes are constructed from the values of z0
tiˆ ° and ˆ ¾ such that the ﬁrst node





0ˆ ° ¡ ˆ ¾, the second node lies ˆ ¾
2 above the overall mean, and the
third node at the upper boundary of the support of the types, i.e., ¿3 = ¯ t.14
This formulation implies that sti(¯ t) = ¯ t as suggested by the Nash equilibrium.
In the optimization algorithm we continuously check that the slopes are positive
and that the bid function stays above the 45±-line. These restrictions implies
restrictions on the coeﬃcients dti. If the restriction is violated, we restart the
12In the theoretic model the support of types is assumed on [t;t]. In practice these trun-
cations appears so far out in the tails that they do not aﬀect the estimator where we assume
untruncated support.
13We have also investigated higher order polynomials and splines, but we have no reliable
results to present in this version.
14In previous versions we tried to have the same nodes for all auctions. This implied that
we observed a relative small number of random draws on the ﬁrst segment, which caused the
optimization of the strategy parameters to collapse (no eﬀects of changing the slope on this
segment for high-cost ﬁrms). This was due to the formulation of the splines where the ﬁrst
element of the strategy parameter vector only aﬀects the slope in the ﬁrst segment. Another
formulation of the splines might reduce this problem.
16process with new start values.
Thus, we solve the CSE ﬁxed point problem over the 3nt constrained pa-






































1(ti < ¿p)(ti ¡ ¿p) (21)







(1+exp(¡x=h))2 with bandwidth h =
t¡t
100.
(Armantier & Richard 2000) propose the following algorithm to implement
the feasible estimator.
Step 1 Initialize the iterative process to ﬁnd the ﬁxed point by guessing some
values for the bidders’ types ˆ t0, e.g., the type ˆ t0
ti equals some linear trans-
formation of the the observed action xti. Set k = 0.
Step 2 Estimate the structural parameters ˆ Ωk = (ˆ °k; ˆ ¾k) using the chosen esti-
mator, e.g. the OLS estimator in (17) using the vector of guessed types
ˆ tk. Check convergence if k > 0. In order to assess convergence, we
















° < 1e¡4, where kxk denotes the max-
imum of the absolute values of x. Hence, we check convergence w.r.t. the
structural parameters and the implied types. If convergence, STOP and
report ˆ Ωk, otherwise continue to Step 3.
Step 3 Use ˆ Ωk to construct the distribution parameters of the bidders’ costs in
each auction using ˆ µk
ti = (z0
tiˆ °k;¾k).
Step 4 Solve the CSE using the procedures presented in section 2, yielding the
17CSE strategies s(3)(tt;dk
t; ˆ Ωk) and update the “guess” of the types as
ˆ t
k+1
t = s¡1(xt; ˆ dk
t; ˆ Ωk).15
Since we iterate over diﬀerent values of Ω, we want the CSE solutions, i.e.,
(dt)T
t=1, to be smooth in Ω. This is achieved by using common random numbers.
This means that outside the iterative algorithm we draw a set of uniform random
numbers, which are transformed to normal variables as a function of the Ω’s and
the zti’s.
At this stage we ignore the eﬀect of MC simulations on the standard errors
of the estimates and treat the simulated types as perfectly observable. This will
under-estimate the true covariance matrix.16
The expected social cost of ineﬃcient allocation of contracts, denoted by S,
can be deﬁned as the expected diﬀerence between the contracted ﬁrm’s contract
cost and the lowest contract cost in the set of bidding ﬁrms.17 In an eﬃcient
auction, this diﬀerence is always zero. We approximate this expectation using
the average of a large number of simulated outcomes of the observed procure-
ments. In the simulations, we adopt the estimated distributions of bidders cost













where the subscript c holds the index of the contracted ﬁrm in replication r and
Nt denotes the set of bidding ﬁrms on contract t. The predicted social cost in
the sample, denoted by ˆ s, is calculated using the predicted types and observed
15Note that Ω parameterizes the distribution function F().
16The covariance matrix could be evaluated using bootstrap methods. This is, however, not
done in this version.






(ˆ ttc ¡ minfˆ ttigi2Nt)TONt (24)
The expected excessive procurement cost, denoted by P, is deﬁned as the
diﬀerence between the total procurement cost given the prevailing ﬁrst price




















(xtc ¡ minfˆ ttigi2Ntnc)TONt (27)
i.e., the diﬀerence between the observed bid and the predicted second low cost
of the bidding ﬁrms.
5 Results from auctions of road marking con-
tracts
Some of the ﬁrms included in the data set were not present in the market until
1999, and some ﬁrms participated only in a few auctions. In order to identify
the ﬁrm speciﬁc dummies, and to get convergence in the iterative process we
have, at this stage, been forced to drop these ﬁrms from the ﬁnal reduced form
data set. The reduced form data set thus contains 133 auctions including about
570 bids. In the structural analysis, dropping a ﬁrm invalidates the use of the
auctions where the dropped ﬁrm has been bidding. Further, we drop auctions
19Table 5: Estimates on submission and bid levels of active ﬁrms. Dependent
variable: lnBid
Coeﬀ. Probit All bids Winning bids Non-winning bids
(a) (b) (c) (d)
const 4:08 ¤ ¤ 2:72 ¤ ¤ 2:60 ¤ ¤ 2:73 ¤ ¤
(0:83) (0:04) (0:07) (0:04)
lnton 0:16¤ ¡0:02 ¤ ¤ ¡0:01 ¡0:02 ¤ ¤
(0:08) (0:00) (0:01) (0:00)
nbids ¡0:01 ¡0:00 ¡0:01¤
(0:00) (0:01) (0:00)
lndist ¡0:64 ¤ ¤ 0:02 ¤ ¤ 0:02¤ 0:02¤
(0:12) (0:01) (0:01) (0:01)
utilr 0:55 0:01 ¡0:08 ¤ ¤ 0:01
(0:34) (0:02) (0:03) (0:02)
putilr 0:05¤ ¡0:01 ¤ ¤ ¡0:00 ¤ ¤ ¡0:01
(0:02) (0:00) (0:00) (0:00)
lncmind ¡0:07 0:01 0:02 0:01
(0:14) (0:01) (0:01) (0:01)
cminu 2:79 ¤ ¤ 0:09¤ 0:17 ¤ ¤ 0:07
(0:92) (0:04) (0:05) (0:05)
incum 1:28 ¤ ¤ ¡0:01¤ ¡0:02 0:01
(0:34) (0:01) (0:01) (0:01)
lambda 0:06 ¤ ¤ ¡0:03 0:07 ¤ ¤
(0:02) (0:02) (0:02)
Note: In column (b)-(d), White’s standard errors are presented in parenthesis. ’*’ and ’**’
denotes signiﬁcance on 10 and 1 per cent level (double sided), respectively.
with less than 3 bidders and contracts in the province Gotland.18 Thus, the
ﬁnal data set used in the structural analysis thus contains 90 auctions including
444 bids in total.
5.1 Results from reduced form analysis
In Table 5, we present the estimated parameters of equation (13) in column
(a) and (14) in columns (b)-(d). In this initial analysis, we have used OLS to
estimate the parameters of the bid level functions. We also present estimates
on bid levels based on winning bids.
The results in Table 5 exhibit some interesting features. The probit model in-
dicates that the probability of submitting a bid decreases with distance (LNDIST),
18Gotland is an island located some distance from the main land. There is one single ﬁrm
operating on this island and the costs for shipping equipments for the other ﬁrms is probably
much larger as compared to the transportation costs on the main land.
20and increases with the potential utilization rate (PUTILR) and the minimum
utilization rate of competitors (CMINU). We also notice that incumbent ﬁrms
are more likely to submit a bid. The contract size (LNTON) is positively sig-
niﬁcant on 10 per cent level, which indicates that larger contracts receive more
attention from the potential suppliers. There are also signiﬁcant diﬀerences
across ﬁrms and regions (not reported in the table) indicating that ﬁrms are
potentially asymmetric. The results are in general consistent with economic in-
tuition, with the exception that a ﬁrms potential utilization rate was expected
to be negatively correlated with the submission decision due to capacity con-
straints. This could be perhaps explained by a U-shaped cost function w.r.t.
the utilization rate, where most ﬁrms are situated on the downward sloping
interval. However, it is interesting to ﬁnd that the minimum utilization rate
of competitors enters the decision signiﬁcantly. One potential interpretation of
this is that a ﬁrm acknowledges that the competitors are ”busy” and therefor
expects them to submit higher bids. This would increase the ﬁrms expected
possibility to win the contract.19
The parameters of the bid level model based on all bids (578 observations)
exhibit in general the expected signs; larger contracts receive lower bids per
unit (bids are in SEK per kilo), whereas distance and the competitors minimum
utilization rate increase the bid levels. The number of bidders, and the distance
of the competitors do not enter in a signiﬁcant way, although the signs are
the expected. The exception is (again) the potential utilization rate, which
enters in a negatively signiﬁcant way, i.e., higher utilization rates implies lower
bid levels, all else equal. Finally, the ¯¸ parameter (LAMBDA) is signiﬁcant
positive, indicating that the error terms in the submission and bid level functions
are positively correlated. One (counter-intuitive) interpretation of this is that a
ﬁrm that is more likely to submit a bid is also more likely to submit a high bid.
Column (c) presents the results based on the winning bids (124 observations)
and column (d) relates to the non-winning bids (454) bids. Some interesting
19This is unfortunately inconsistent with the result that higher utilization rate implies lower
bids (see below).
21results emerge from these estimates. The utilization rate and the potential
utilization rate reduce the bid level for winning ﬁrms. Furthermore, a higher
utilization rate of competitors implies higher bids. In column (d) we present
the corresponding estimates based on the non-winning bids. They main dif-
ferences between the results in (c) and (d) are i) contract size and number of
bidders enters with a negative signiﬁcant coeﬃcient in non-winning bids, ii) the
utilization rate, the potential utilization rate, and the competitors’ utilization
rates are not signiﬁcant for non-winning bids, and iii) the estimated parameter
¯¸ is insigniﬁcant for winning bids (almost negatively signiﬁcant), but signiﬁ-
cantly positive for non-winning bids. Hence, there is a negative (insigniﬁcant)
correlation between submission and the level of the winning bid, but a positive
correlation between submission and non-winning bids.
We conclude from the results in this section that the ﬁrms’ bids are related
to ﬁrm speciﬁc characteristics such as distance to contract site, the potential
utilization rate, incumbency, and perhaps even the utilization rate (signiﬁcant
for winning bids). These will therefore be included in the structural analysis as
control variables for the observable shifts in the ﬁrms’ cost distributions. We
will also include the (log of) contract size to control for economies of scale.
5.2 Results from structural analysis
The data set used for the structural CSE analysis consists of 90 auctions and
444 bids. We assume that the cost draws made for each ﬁrm in each auction are
conditionally independent. Hence, we abstract from the more plausible situation
with synergies across auctions. The ﬁxed point problem in the CSE algorithm
is generally solved using initially 1000 Halton draws.20
In Table 6, we present the results from the estimations based on the nested
ﬁxed point algorithm. We have chosen to include those variables that turned
out signiﬁcant in the reduced form analysis. For comparison, we also present es-
20If the algorithm fails to ﬁnd a zero point of the vector of FOCs, we sequentially increase
the number of random draws to 3000 and 4500 Halton draws, respectively. In equilibrium all
auctions converge with 1000 draws.
22timates based on a simpliﬁed reduced form model where the dependent variable
is the observed bid in SEK per kilo.21
In Table 6, coeﬃcients relating to the ﬁrm speciﬁc variables distance and
incumbency are signiﬁcant whereas the coeﬃcients relating to the poorly mea-
sured utilization rate are insigniﬁcant. Further, some of the ﬁrm and regional
speciﬁc dummies are signiﬁcant indicating that there are some more unobserved
heterogeneity across ﬁrms and regions.
Comparison across columns, indicates that the costs are more “sensitive”
to variations in ﬁrm speciﬁc variables than bids. E.g. the eﬀect of distance
is higher on costs than on bids, which seems intuitive since the bids can not
fully compensate for cost increase due to strategic considerations. For example,
the eﬀect of being the incumbent ﬁrm reduces the cost per kilo by 0.42 SEK,
whereas the bid is only reduced by 0.23 SEK. This eﬀect is also almost exclu-
sively observed for the ﬁrm speciﬁc dummies. Finally, the estimated standard
deviation of the stochastic cost draw is 1.16.
Based on the estimated distribution of the costs, we can assess the impor-
tance of ineﬃciently allocated contracts. We ﬁnd that 16 (out of 90) contracts
may be allocated to another than the low cost ﬁrm. This ineﬃciency is assessed
to about 1.8 per cent out of potential social costs of completing the contracts.
The expected value of the social costs is simulated to about 0.04 per cent.22
Furthermore, if a second price auction mechanism was used, the predicted pro-
curement costs for the observed sample would be reduced by approximately
2.8 per cent and by 1.1 per cent in expectations with 4.5 per cent ineﬃciently
allocated contracts on average.
Finally, the average markup, i.e., the per cent increase in bids above costs,
is about 3.5 per cent for non-winning bids and 4.5 per cent for the winning
bids. This means that the winning ﬁrm actually pads their costs more than the
average non-winning ﬁrm.
21We have not controlled for selection bias in this version. Further, in contrast to the results
presented in Table 5, we have not used the logarithmical bid here.
22Based on R = 2000 replications of the data set,










































Note: Reference ﬁrm is EAB, reference region is MALA. Standard errors in
parenthesis. * and ** denotes signiﬁcance on 10 and 1 per cent levels (double
sided)
246 Conclusions
This paper investigates the social costs induced by ineﬃcient allocation of con-
tracts in a ﬁrst price, sealed bid auction with ex ante asymmetric bidders. We
adopt a constrained strategy equilibrium (CSE) approach where the players are
constrained to simpliﬁed strategies in order to estimate the structural elements
of the players private values. Conditional on these estimates, we investigate the
importance of ineﬃciently allocated contracts.
The empirical analysis is based on procurements of road marking services in
Sweden during 1992 through 1999. We observe bids that are assumed to be gen-
erated via proﬁt maximizing ﬁrms with private and conditionally independent
costs.
The market is spatially dispersed with relatively high transportation costs.
The potential suppliers, i.e., the bidding ﬁrms, are located at various places
and consequently the costs for transportation varies across ﬁrms and contracts.
These asymmetries are observable for all participants in the market. Hence,
the ﬁrms are assumed ex ante asymmetric. This asymmetry implies that the
ﬁrst price sealed bid auction design no longer guarantees that the low cost ﬁrm
receives the contract. If the low cost ﬁrm fails to win the contract we say that
there is an social cost due to ineﬃcient procurement design. We ﬁnd that, for
the present sample, the social costs of ineﬃcient allocations are a little less than
2 per cent of total costs.
The second price auction is eﬃcient even if the bidders are asymmetric. The
expected procurement costs in the second price auction is diﬀerent from the
expected costs in the ﬁrst price auction (Hansen (1984) and Milgrom & Weber
(1982)). In simulations based on the estimated structural parameters, we ﬁnd
that a second price format reduces the predicted procurement cost in the sample
by about 2.8 per cent of total procurement costs.
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A Nash equilibrium in asymmetric private value
auctions






¡i ;F) ¸ U(si(ti);sNE
¡i ;F); (28)
8ti 2 Ti;8si 2 Si;8i 2 N
Maskin & Riley (2000b) proves that, i) if the bidders’ utilities are monotonic in
ti, and ii) if the bidders’ are risk neutral or risk averse, then the there exists a
NE in monotonic strategies. This implies that an existing NE strategy sNE
i (t)
is invertible for all i 2 N and t 2 T. Denoting the inverse by s
¡1;NE
i (xi)(= ti),
and assuming risk neutrality and independence w.r.t types (which we have done
in (2) and (3)), we can deﬁne the NE as the solution to the ﬁxed point problem
sNE
i (ti;sNE







j (xi))); 8i 2 N (29)
The ﬁrst order conditions (FOC) of this optimization problem are, for all


























dxi illustrates that the FOCs constitute a

























); 8i 2 N (31)
Hence, the issue of existence of a Nash equilibrium in this game is equivalent
to the existence of a solution to the system of ODEs. Assuming that
A.1. F the distribution of types, is continuous, and
A.2. F and its probability density function f = F0 are bounded away from zero
over the support of [t;t],
Lebrun (1999) and Bajari (2000) prove that there exists a unique Nash equi-
librium in pure strategies that is continuous and strictly increasing in ti. The
solution is characterized by the system of ODEs in (31) with 2 £ n boundary
conditions such that 8i 2 N, and for some »¤ 2 Xi(F)
s
¡1
i (»¤) = t (32a)
s
¡1
i (t) = t (32b)
The boundary conditions state that Gi, the induced marginal distributions
of bids, have connected supports on X(F) = [»¤;t] 2 R;8i 2 N, which depends
on the distribution F. It can also be shown (see e.g. ((Bajari & Ye 2000)) that








28Under some circumstances we can solve a system like (31) either analytically
or by standard numerical ODE solving procedures. However, the system in (31)
has some features that makes it hard to solve analytically as well as numerically.
The system is characterized by a singularity at xi = t since the system tends
towards 0
0 as xi ! t
¡. Therefore, one can not use the upper boundary to solve
the system of ODEs. If the constant »¤ were known, we could solve the system
using standard numerical methods (e.g. a Runge-Kutta algorithm).
Bajari (2000) shows that the inverse bid function is monotonic in » in the
sense that if » < »0 then s
¡1
i (t;») > s
¡1
i (t;»0);8t 2 T. This property can be used
to ﬁnd a » arbitrarily close to »¤. Let s»(t) = (si(t;»))i2N denote the collection
of solutions of (31) conditional on the boundary condition s
¡1
i (») = t 8i where
» 2 Xi(F). If F is the set of all functions such that F ´ ff : f 2 C1;f : T !
T;f(t) ¸ t;8t 2 Tg, then
i) s
»
i(t) 2 F, 8» ¸ »¤, 8i = 1 ! nt, and
ii) s
»
i(t) = 2 F, 8» < »¤, and some i = 1 ! nt
Hence, an algorithm that seeks over » 2 Xi(F) and checks if the elements of
the implied strategy proﬁle s» belongs to F, and satisﬁes si(t) = t, could be
implemented to ﬁnd an arbitrarily small interval »¤ §";" > 0 that contains the
true value »¤.23
In an attempt to illustrate the NE, Figure 3 gives the approximative shape
of the solutions to the ODEs. We use a set of three asymmetric bidders,
where the distribution of types is assumed truncated normal N(¹i;9) where
¹ = (14;14:5;15) and 5 · t · 20. The bid functions are approximated using
a Runge-Kutta algorithm combined with the search algorithm discussed above
with " = 1e¡10. Due to numerical issues, the solutions presented in the ﬁgure
are rather poor in the right tail hand of the cost distributions. The horizontal
axis shows the costs and the vertical axis shows the optimal bid.
23Bajari & Ye (2000) also propose an alternative algorithm based on a convergent sequence
of best responses.
























Figure 3: Nash Equilibrium strategies with three asymmetric bidders.
In this example, the value of »¤ is approximately 12:8, and the connected
support of bids is consequently X(F) ¼ [12:8;25]. It can also be noted that the
Firm 1, the “low cost” ﬁrm, bids higher than the other ﬁrms conditionally on
the cost draw. Lebrun (1999) and Pesendorfer (2000) provide proofs that if Fi is
statistically dominated by Fj, then Gi is statistically dominated by Gj. In our
example with identical variances across ﬁrms, this means that the ﬁrm with the
lowest expected costs is also the most probable winning ﬁrm. It is also notable
that in contrast to the complex structure of the system of ODEs, the solutions
seem to be quite smooth and “well-behaved”.
The issue of ineﬃciency is also illustrated in the ﬁgure. Let L denote the ﬁrm
with the most preferable cost distribution, i.e., N(14;9) and let H denote the
ﬁrm with the least preferable distribution N(15;9). Let tL and sL(tL) denote
the cost draw and proﬁt maximizing bid of ﬁrm L, respectively. Deﬁne tH and
sH(tH) correspondingly. For H to ”beat” L in the auction, it is required that
sH(tH) < sL(tL), that is, tH < s
¡1
H (sL(tL)), where s¡1() denotes the inverse
strategy function. Since s
¡1
H (x) > s
¡1
L (x)8x, tH is not necessarily less than
30tL, i.e., H may win the auction even though tH > tL. In the ﬁgure, this is
illustrated by the horizontal distance between the strategy functions of ﬁrm L
and H.
31